Foundations of Modern Macroeconomics
Second Edition
Chapter 16: Overlapping generations in continuous time
(sections 16.1 – 16.4.4)

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Outline

1 Introduction

2 Individual behaviour under lifetime uncertainty
   - Yaari’s lessons
   - Realistic mortality profile
   - The role of annuities

3 Macroeconomic consequences of lifetime uncertainty
   - Blanchard’s model
   - Basic model properties
   - Some simple extensions
Aims of this lecture (1)

- Study “work-horse” model of modern macroeconomics which is based on overlapping generations. Motivation for doing this:
  - Ricardian equivalence may be inappropriate (the chain of bequests may not be fully operational).
  - Tractable way to introduce (and study consequences of) heterogeneous agents.
  - Contains Ramsey model as a special case.
- Show some applications of the Blanchard-Yaari model.
  - Fiscal policy (crowding out effects of public consumption).
  - Debt neutrality revisited.
Aims of this lecture (2)

- Extend the BY model in a number of minor/major directions:
  - Embed it in an endogenous growth model (how do a country’s demography and economic growth interact?)
  - Age-dependent productivity (mimic life-cycle; reintroduces possibility of dynamic inefficiency – oversaving?).
  - Apply model to the small open economy (well-defined dynamics for the current account and consumption).
  - Endogenous labour supply (distorting aspects of taxation).
  - Life-cycle labour supply and retirement (ageing and retirement).

- Punchlines.
Key questions studied by Yaari:

- How does a household behave if it faces *lifetime uncertainty*?
- What kind of institutions exist to insure oneself against risk of having a long life (and running out of assets)?

Up to now we have only studied models without lifetime uncertainty:

- In the two-period consumption model the agent knows he/she will expire at the end of period 2 (certain death).
- In the Ramsey model the agent has an infinite horizon (certain eternal life).
Yaari’s lessons (2)

- A more realistic scenario:
  - Agent has a finite life.
  - Date of death is uncertain (but demographic data exist).

- Model complications: if date of death is uncertain then...
  - Complication (A): The agent faces a stochastic decision problem. Hence, the *expected utility hypothesis* must be used.
  - Complication (B): The restriction on terminal assets becomes more complicated. If $A(D)$ is real assets at time $D$ and $D$ is the (stochastic) time of death, then the terminal condition is that $A(D) \geq 0$ with probability one.
Complication (A) solved by Yaari (1)

- Even though $D$ is stochastic we have a good idea about the distribution of $D$ in the population (ask the demographers). See Figures 16.1 – 16.2. The probability density function (PDF) of $D$ is:

$$\phi(D) \geq 0, \forall D \geq 0, \quad \Phi(\bar{D}) = \int_0^{\bar{D}} \phi(D) dD = 1 \quad (S1)$$

- Densities are non-negative.
- $D$ is non-negative.
- $\bar{D}$ is the maximum lifetime.

- Define (stochastic) lifetime utility as:

$$\Lambda(D) \equiv \int_0^D U(C(\tau)) e^{-\rho \tau} d\tau \quad (S2)$$
But since $D$ is stochastic, an agent has the following objective function:

$$E(\Lambda(D)) \equiv \int_0^\bar{D} \phi(D)\Lambda(D) \, dD$$

Using (S1) and (S2) we can derive a simple expression for expected lifetime utility:

$$E(\Lambda(D)) \equiv \int_0^\bar{D} \phi(D) \left[ \int_0^D U(C(\tau)) e^{-\rho\tau} \, d\tau \right] \, dD$$

$$= \int_0^\bar{D} \left[ \int_{\tau}^\bar{D} \phi(D) \, dD \right] U(C(\tau)) e^{-\rho\tau} \, d\tau$$
Complication (A) solved by Yaari (3)

- In compact form we write:

\[ E(\Lambda(D)) \equiv \int_0^\bar{D} \left[ 1 - \Phi(\tau) \right] \cdot U(C(\tau)) e^{-\rho \tau} d\tau \quad (S3) \]

- In (S3), the term \(1 - \Phi(\tau)\) is the probability that the consumer will still be alive at time \(\tau\):

\[ 1 - \Phi(\tau) \equiv \int_\tau^\bar{D} \phi(D)dD \]

- The key thing to note about (S3) is that **lifetime uncertainty merely affects the rate at which felicity is discounted!**

This is Yaari’s first lesson
Complication (B) solved by Yaari (1)

Let’s solve the next complication – dealing with the time-of-death wealth constraint.

First he derives the appropriate terminal condition on real assets in the presence of lifetime uncertainty (but in the absence of insurance opportunities):

\[ A(\bar{D}) = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (S4)

\[ C(\tau) \leq w(\tau) \text{ whenever } A(\tau) = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (S5)

(S4): Assets must be zero if agent reaches maximum age.

(S5): If agent hits constraint in period \( \tau \) then he/she must start saving \( \dot{A} > 0 \) immediately to avoid defaulting.
Complication (B) solved by Yaari (2)

Second he shows that the consumption Euler equation is:

\[
\frac{\dot{C}(\tau)}{C(\tau)} = \sigma (C(\tau)) \cdot [r(\tau) - \rho - \mu(\tau)] \quad (S6)
\]

where \( \mu(\tau) \) is the instantaneous probability of death at time \( \tau \):

\[
\mu(\tau) \equiv \frac{\phi(\tau)}{1 - \Phi(\tau)} \quad (S7)
\]

**Note:** As we saw above, the lifetime uncertainty shows up as a heavier discounting of future felicity (one may not be around to enjoy felicity!). This is Yaari’s first lesson again.
Third, he argues that in reality all kind of insurance instruments exist. He introduces the so-called actuarial note.

- Carries instantaneous yield $r^A(\tau)$.
- If you buy €1 of such notes: yield of $r^A(\tau)$ while you are alive; you lose the principal when you die; yield must be higher than yield on other instruments ($r^A > r$) ANNUITY.
- If you sell such a note: get €1 from life insurance company; pay premium of $r^A$ while you are alive; debt is cancelled when you die; premium must compensate risk of the LIC ($r^A > r$) LIFE-INSURED LOAN.
Complication (B) solved by Yaari (4)

- Under *actuarial fairness* the rate of return on the two types of instruments satisfy a no-arbitrage condition:

\[ r^A(\tau) = r(\tau) + \mu(\tau) \]  

(S8)

The yield on actuarial notes equals the interest rate on traditional assets plus the instantaneous probability of death.

- Fourth, Yaari shows that the household will always fully insure, i.e. will hold real wealth in the form of actuarial notes. This means that...
  - The budget identity is:

\[ \dot{A}(\tau) = r^A(\tau)A(\tau) + w(\tau) - C(\tau) \]

- The terminal asset condition is trivially met (WHY?):

- The consumption Euler equation is:

\[ \frac{\dot{C}(\tau)}{C(\tau)} = \sigma [C(\tau)] \cdot [r^A(\tau) - \rho - \mu(\tau)] \]  

(S9)
Fifth, combining (S8) and (S9) we derive Yaari’s second lesson:

$$\frac{\dot{C}(\tau)}{C(\tau)} = \sigma (C(\tau)) \cdot [r(\tau) - \rho]$$  \hspace{1cm} (S10)

With fully insured (actuarially fair) lifetime uncertainty, the death rate drops out of the consumption Euler equation altogether! (Note: The level of consumption is affected by the death rate.)
Figure 16.1: Cumulative distribution function

\[ \Phi(x) \]

\[ \Phi(D_0) \]

\[ \Phi(D_1) \]

\[ 0 \]

\[ D_0 \]

\[ D_1 \]

\[ D \]
Figure 16.2: Density function and survival probability
Visualization using Dutch demographic data (1)

- Use specific functional form for the demographic process (for \(0 \leq u \leq \bar{D} \equiv \frac{\ln \mu_0}{\mu_1}\)):

\[
\Phi(u) \equiv \frac{e^{\mu_1 u} - 1}{\mu_0 - 1}, \quad 1 - \Phi(u) \equiv \frac{\mu_0 - e^{\mu_1 u}}{\mu_0 - 1}
\] (S11)

- Estimate parameters \(\mu_0\) and \(\mu_1\) using actual demographic data (Netherlands cohort born in 1920): \(\hat{\mu}_0 = 41.06\) and \(\hat{\mu}_1 = 0.0429\)

- Estimated maximum age is \(\bar{D} = 86.6\) years

- Life expectancy at birth of 65.4 years.
Recall (S11):

$$\Phi (u) \equiv \frac{e^{\mu_1 u} - 1}{\mu_0 - 1}, \quad 1 - \Phi (u) \equiv \frac{\mu_0 - e^{\mu_1 u}}{\mu_0 - 1}$$

From this expression we find (for $0 < u < \bar{D}$):

$$\phi (u) \equiv \frac{d\Phi (u)}{du} = \frac{\mu_1 e^{\mu_1 u}}{\mu_0 - 1}$$ \hspace{1cm} (S12)

$$\mu (u) \equiv \frac{\phi (u)}{1 - \Phi (u)} = \frac{\mu_1 e^{\mu_1 u}}{\mu_0 - e^{\mu_1 u}}$$ \hspace{1cm} (S13)

See Figures 16.3 – 16.4.
Figure 16.3: Logarithm of the instantaneous mortality rate

\[
\ln \mu(u) = \ln \left( \frac{u}{(u)^{0.05}} \right)
\]

age in the planning period \( u \)

- Age-dependent
- Perpetual youth
Figure 16.4: Expected remaining lifetime

\[ \Delta(u,0) \]

age in the planning period \((u)\)
With actuarially fair (perfect) annuities

- Annuity rate facing age-\( u \) person is \( r + \mu(u) \)
- Consumption growth is \( \dot{C}(u)/C(u) = r - \rho > 0 \)
- Consumption and assets over the life cycle:

\[
\frac{C(u)}{w} = \frac{\Delta(0, r)}{\Delta(0, \rho)} e^{(r-\rho)u} \quad (S14)
\]

\[
\frac{A(u)}{w} = e^{(r-\rho)u} \frac{\Delta(0, r)}{\Delta(0, \rho)} \Delta(u, \rho) - \Delta(u, r) \quad (S15)
\]

- Demographic discount function:

\[
\Delta(u, \psi) \equiv \frac{e^{\psi u}}{\mu_0 - e^{\mu_1 u}} \left[ \mu_0 \cdot \frac{e^{-\psi u} - e^{-\psi \bar{D}}}{\psi} + \frac{e^{(\mu_1 - \psi)u} - e^{(\mu_1 - \psi)\bar{D}}}{\mu_1 - \psi} \right] \quad (S16)
\]

- See Figures 16.5 – 16.6.
Figure 16.5: Consumption

![Graph showing consumption over age](image-url)
Figure 16.6: Financial assets

The graph shows the financial assets $A(u)$ as a function of age in the planning period ($u$). The solid line represents financial assets with lifelike uncertainty, while the dashed line represents financial assets without lifetime uncertainty. The x-axis represents age in the planning period ($u$), ranging from 0 to 90, and the y-axis represents financial assets ranging from -6 to 8.
In the absence of annuities

- individual faces time-of-death borrowing constraint, $A(u) \geq 0$
- consumption growth is $\frac{\dot{C}(u)}{C(u)} = r - (\rho + \mu(u))$ until borrowing constraint is encountered
- individual runs out of financial assets and consumes wage income thereafter
- See Figures 16.5 – 16.6.
Bird’s-eye view (1)

- Blanchard (1985): general equilibrium model with finite lives and overlapping generations
- Key idea: Blanchard embedded Yaari’s approach in a general equilibrium framework. He simplified the approach by assuming that the planning horizon is *age-independent* and is distributed *exponentially* (“perpetual youth” assumption).
- Implications of this assumption:
  - The death rate equals $\mu$ (a constant, independent of age).
  - The expected planning horizon equals $1/\mu$ in that case.
  - *(Note:)* As $\mu = 0$ we have the Ramsey model again.
  - Household decision rules linear in age parameter (see below).
Bird’s-eye view (2)

He furthermore assumed that at each instant a large cohort of agents in born (bare of any financial assets as they do not receive inheritance—unloved agents). Implications:

- Denote the cohort born at time \( \tau \) by \( P(\tau, \tau) \equiv \mu P(\tau) \) (with \( P(\tau) \) large): the first index is the birth date and the second index is time.

- All agents face a probability of death of \( \mu \) so \( \mu P(\tau) \) agents die at each instant (\#births equals \#deaths so population size is constant and \( P(\tau) \) can be normalized to unity).

- With large cohorts “probabilities and frequencies coincide” and given the first assumption we can trace the size of each cohort over time:

\[
P(v, \tau) = P(v, v)e^{\mu(v-\tau)}
= \mu e^{\mu(v-\tau)}, \quad \tau \geq v
\]
Because we know cohort sizes we can aggregate all surviving households (nice for macro model).

Eventually, as people die off the cohorts vanish.

We can now derive the implications for individual and aggregate household behaviour. Details are in the chapter. Sketch of the outcome here.
Individual household behaviour (1)

- Expected lifetime utility of agent of cohort $v$ in period $t$:

\[
E(\Lambda(v, t)) \equiv \int_t^{\infty} [1 - \Phi(\tau - t)] \ln C(v, \tau)e^{\rho(t-\tau)}d\tau \\
= \int_t^{\infty} \ln C(v, \tau)e^{(\rho+\mu)(t-\tau)}d\tau
\]

- Budget identity:

\[
\dot{A}(v, \tau) = [r(\tau) + \mu]A(v, \tau) + w(\tau) - T(\tau) - C(v, \tau) \quad (S18)
\]

- No Ponzi Game (NPG) condition:

\[
\lim_{\tau \to \infty} e^{-R^A(t, \tau)}A(v, \tau) = 0, \quad R^A(t, \tau) \equiv \int_t^{\tau} [r(s) + \mu] ds
\]
Individual household behaviour (2)

- Decision rule for consumption:

\[
C(v, t) = (\rho + \mu) [A(v, t) + H(t)] \quad \text{(S19)}
\]

\[
H(t) \equiv \int_t^\infty [w(\tau) - T(\tau)] e^{-RA(t, \tau)} d\tau \quad \text{(S20)}
\]

- Notes:
  - Marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth is \( \rho + \mu \)
    (does not feature an age index due to the perpetual youth assumption).
  - Human wealth discounted at the annuity rate of interest, \( r(\tau) + \mu \).
We know that the size of cohort $v$ at time $t$ is $\mu e^{\mu (v-t)}$. This means that we can define aggregate variables by aggregating over all existing agents at time $t$. For example, aggregate consumption is:

$$C(t) \equiv \mu \int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{\mu (v-t)} C(v, t) dv$$

In view of (S19) aggregate consumption satisfies:

$$C(t) \equiv \mu \int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{\mu (v-t)} (\rho + \mu) [A(v, t) + H(t)] dv$$

$$= (\rho + \mu) \left[ e^{\mu (v-t)} A(v, t)dv + \mu e^{\mu (v-t)} H(t)dv \right]_{-\infty}^{t}$$

$$= (\rho + \mu) [A(t) + H(t)]$$
Similarly, the aggregate budget identity can be derived:

$$\dot{A}(t) = r(t)A(t) + w(t) - T(t) - C(t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (S21)

The market rate of interest (not the annuity rate) features in the aggregate budget identity: the term $\mu A(t)$ is a transfer–via the life insurance companies–from agents who die to agents who stay alive.

Recall (S18) (for period $t$):

$$\dot{A}(v, t) = [r(t) + \mu] A(v, t) + w(t) - T(t) - C(v, t)$$
Aggregate household behaviour (3)

- The consumption Euler equation for individual agents is:

\[
\frac{\dot{C}(v,t)}{C(v,t)} = r(t) - \rho
\]

The “aggregate Euler equation” satisfies:

\[
\frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} = [r(t) - \rho] - \mu(\rho + \mu) \frac{A(t)}{C(t)}
\]

\[
= \frac{\dot{C}(v,t)}{C(v,t)} - \mu \frac{C(t) - C(t,t)}{C(t)}
\]

- Note: Aggregate consumption growth differs from individual consumption growth due to the turnover of generations. Newborns are poorer than the average household and therefore drag down aggregate consumption growth.
We now have all the ingredients of the BY model (firm behaviour is standard; we allow for debt creation in the GBC): see Table 16.1.

In Figure 16.7 we show the phase diagram for a special case of the BY model, under the assumption that there is no government at all ($T(t) = G(t) = B(t) = 0$).

The $\dot{K} = 0$ line represents $(C, K)$ combinations for which net investment is zero. It has the usual properties:

- Golden rule point at $A_2$.
- $\dot{K} > 0$ ($\dot{K} < 0$) for points below (above) the $\dot{K} = 0$ line (see horizontal arrows).
The $\dot{C} = 0$ line represents $(C, K)$ combinations for which aggregate consumption is constant over time. It has some unusual properties:

- It lies entirely to the left of the dashed line, representing the Keynes-Ramsey capital stock (for which $r^{KR} = \rho$). Why?

Using the aggregate Euler equation for the BY model we get:

\[
\frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} = \left[r(t) - \rho\right] - \mu(\rho + \mu)K(t)C(t) = 0 \quad \Rightarrow
\]

\[
r^{BY} - \rho = \mu(\rho + \mu)\frac{K^{BY}}{C} \quad \Rightarrow
\]

\[
r^{BY} > \rho
\]

The interest rate strictly higher than $\rho$ (due to generational turnover). Hence, $K^{BY}$ strictly smaller than $K^{KR}$. 
Continued.

The $\dot{C} = 0$ line is upward sloping. Can be understood by comparing points $E_0$, $B$, and $C$ in Figure 16.7. In $E_0$ and $B$, $r$ is the same but $K/C$ is higher in $B$. To restore $\dot{C} = 0$ we must have a move to point $C$, where $K$ is lower than in $B$ ($r$ higher) and $K/C$ is lower.

For points above (below) the $\dot{C} = 0$ line, the generational turnover effect is too low (too strong), and aggregate consumption growth is positive (negative). See the vertical arrows in Figure 16.7.

The BY model without a government features a unique equilibrium at $E_0$ which is saddle point stable.
### Table 16.1: The Blanchard-Yaari model

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{C}(t) &= [r(t) - \rho] C(t) - \mu(\rho + \mu) [K(t) + B(t)] \\
\dot{K}(t) &= Y(t) - C(t) - G(t) - \delta K(t) \\
\dot{B}(t) &= r(t) B(t) + G(t) - T(t) \\
r(t) + \delta &= F_K(K(t), L(t)) \\
w(t) &= F_L(K(t), L(t)) \\
L(t) &= 1 \\
Y(t) &= F(K(t), L(t))
\end{align*}
\]
Figure 16.7: Phase diagram of the Blanchard-Yaari model

- \( C(t) \)
- \( r(t) > \rho \) and \( r(t) < \rho \)
- \( \dot{C}(t) = 0 \)
- \( \dot{K}(t) = 0 \)
- Points: \( E_0, A_1, A_2, A_3 \)
- Lines: \( K^{BY}, K^{KR}, K^{GR} \)
- Capital stock: \( K(t) \)
Some basic model properties

- **Fiscal policy**: increase in government consumption financed by means of lump-sum taxes. Issues:
  - Crowding out of private by public consumption?
  - Intergenerational redistribution of resources? How does this work?
- **Non-neutrality of debt**.
  - Does government debt matter?
  - Do deficit-financed policies differ from balanced-budget policies?
Fiscal policy (1)

- Unanticipated and permanent increase in $G$ financed by increase in $T$ (recall $T$ is the same for all agents, regardless of their vintage).
- Abstract from government debt: $\dot{B} = B = 0$ and GBC is static, $G = T$.
- The shock is analyzed in Figure 16.8.
  - The $\dot{K} = 0$ line shifts down by the amount of the shock.
  - The $\dot{C} = 0$ line is unchanged (no supply effect of tax).
  - Steady state shifts from $E_0$ to $E_1$: $C(\infty) \downarrow$ and $K(\infty) \downarrow$ (the latter does not occur in Ramsey model).
Continued.

Transitional dynamics: jump from \( E_0 \) to \( A \) (at impact) followed by gradual move along saddle path from \( A \) to \( E_1 \) thereafter. (Recall: no t.d. in Ramsey model.)

Crowding out results:

\[
-1 < \frac{dC(0)}{dG} < 0
\]

\[
\frac{dC(\infty)}{dG} < -1
\]

Less than one-for-one at impact but more than one-for-one in the long run!
Economic intuition: the $T \uparrow$ causes an intergenerational redistribution of resources away from future towards present generations.

- At impact $C(v, 0) \downarrow$ because $H(0) \downarrow$ (due to $T \uparrow$).
- Households discount net labour income stream, $w - T$, by annuity rate $r + \mu$ (higher than market interest rate, $r$).
- Hence, the drop in $C(v, 0)$, $C(0)$, and $H(0)$ is not large enough, so that private investment in crowded out: $\dot{K}(0) \downarrow$.
- Over time $K(t) \downarrow$, so that $[w(t) - T] \downarrow$, $r(t) \uparrow$, and $H(t) \downarrow$.
- Future newborns poorer than newborns in initial steady state (the former have less capital to work with).
Figure 16.8: Fiscal policy in the Blanchard-Yaari model
The fact that $T$ causes intergenerational redistribution in the fiscal policy case hints at the non-neutrality of debt.

Ricardian non-equivalence can be proven by looking at a simple accounting exercises: substitute the GBC into the HBC.

The aggregate wealth constraint facing household features the following definition for total wealth:

$$A(t) + H(t) \equiv K(t) + B(t) + H(t)$$

$$= K(t) + B(t) + \int_t^\infty [w(\tau) - T(\tau)] e^{-R^A(t,\tau)} d\tau$$

$$= K(t) + \int_t^\infty [w(\tau) - G(\tau)] e^{-R^A(t,\tau)} d\tau + \Omega(t)$$
Non-neutrality of debt (2)

- Here $\Omega(t)$ is defined as:

$$
\Omega(t) \equiv B(t) - \int_t^\infty [T(\tau) - G(\tau)] e^{-R^A(t,\tau)} d\tau \tag{S22}
$$

**Note:** Ricardian equivalence holds iff $\Omega(t) \equiv 0$!

- Recall that the GBC can be written as:

$$
0 = B(t) - \int_t^\infty [T(\tau) - G(\tau)] e^{-R(t,\tau)} d\tau \tag{S23}
$$

- In (S22) primary surpluses are discounted with the annuity rate (see (a)) whereas the market rate is used in (S23) (see (b)).

  - Hence, $\Omega(t)$ only vanishes iff the birth rate is zero, so that $R^A(t,\tau) = R(t,\tau)$, i.e. in the Ramsey model.
  - If $\mu > 0$ then $\Omega(t) \neq 0$ and Ricardian equivalence fails: the path of $T(\tau)$ and the initial debt level do not drop out of the aggregate HBC.
Further model properties

- **Endogenous growth and finite lives:** do finite lives promote or inhibit economic growth?
- **Oversaving and dynamic inefficiency:** is it possible even though all agents are intertemporal optimizers?
Consider a simple capital fundamentalist model (with external effect between firms): \( Y(t) = Z_0 K(t) \), 
\( r(t) + \delta = Z_0 (1 - \varepsilon_L) \), and \( w(t) = \varepsilon_L Y(t) \).

**AK-OLG model:**

\[
\frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} = r - \rho - \mu (\rho + \mu) \frac{K(t)}{C(t)} \tag{S24}
\]

\[
\frac{\dot{K}(t)}{K(t)} = (1 - g) Z_0 - \frac{C(t)}{K(t)} - \delta \tag{S25}
\]

\[
\dot{r} = Z_0 (1 - \varepsilon_L) - \delta \tag{S26}
\]

Define \( \theta(t) \equiv \frac{C(t)}{K(t)} \) and derive:

\[
\frac{\dot{\theta}(t)}{\theta(t)} = -\left[(\varepsilon_L - g) Z_0 + \rho\right] + \theta(t) - \frac{\mu (\rho + \mu)}{\theta(t)} \tag{S27}
\]
Endogenous growth and finite lives (2)

- Unstable differential equation in $\theta$
- No transitional dynamics.
- See Figure 16.9.
  - $CA$ is growth in the capital stock as predicted by (S25)
  - $EE_{BY}$ is growth in consumption as predicted by (S24)
  - OLG equilibrium at $E_0$
- Growth is lower under finite lives (compare $E_0$ and $E'$)
- An increase in the government spending share $g$ reduces growth (compare $E_0$ and $E_1$)
Figure 16.9: Endogenous growth in the B–Y model

\[ \gamma_K(t), \gamma_C(t) \]

\[ \gamma_0^*, \gamma_1^* \]

\[ \theta_0^*, \theta_1^* \]

\[ \text{EE}_{BY}, \text{EE}_{RA}, \text{CA}_0, \text{CA}_1 \]
Age-dependent labour productivity (1)

- **Key idea**: One of the unattractive aspects of the standard BY model is the fact that all agents, regardless of their age, have the same expected remaining lifetime. (Agents enjoy a “perpetual youth”.)

- In reality households do age (get older) and plan to retire from the labour force. There is a life cycle in the pattern of income and one of the motives for saving is to provide for old age (*life-cycle saving*).

- One way to mimic the effects of the life-cycle saving motive is to assume that the household’s productivity in the labour market depends on its age.

- Typically the productivity pattern is *hump shaped*, low early on and during old age and high in the middle.
Age-dependent labour productivity (2)

In the text we show the consequences of a simpler productivity pattern, one where skills are high early on but decline exponentially as the agent gets older. We embed this productivity profile in the standard BY model (with exogenous labour supply). The worker’s efficiency pattern is:

$$E(\tau - \nu) \equiv \frac{\alpha + \mu}{\mu} e^{-\alpha(\tau - \nu)}$$

where $\alpha$ thus measures the rate at which labour productivity declines as one gets older (so far we used $\alpha = 0$).
Age-dependent labour productivity (3)

- The main results (intuitively):
  - Old worker less productive. Firms pay them lower wages. Labour supply exogenous so wage income declines during worker’s life.
  - Motive to “save for a rainy day” (worker does not retire but will eventually work for close to nothing).
  - Human wealth is now age dependent (higher the younger one is).
  - Aggregate human wealth discounted more heavily because of the declining wage as one gets older:

\[
H(t) \equiv \int_t^\infty w(\tau) \exp \left\{ -\int_t^\tau \left[ r(s) + \alpha + \mu \right] ds \right\} d\tau
\]

- The dynamic system characterizing the aggregate economy is also affected by the productivity-decline parameter:
Age-dependent labour productivity (4)

Continued.

\[
\frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} = \left[ r(t) - \rho \right] + \left[ \alpha - (\alpha + \mu)(\rho + \mu) \frac{K(t)}{C(t)} \right]
\]

\[
\dot{K}(t) = F(K(t), 1) - C(t) - \delta K(t),
\]

\[
r(t) \equiv F_K(K(t), 1) - \delta
\]

The aggregate “Euler equation” is more complex:

- Item (a): Individual consumption growth (Euler equation for individual households).
- Item (b): Correction term due to generational turnover depends on interplay between two mechanisms. On the one hand newborns have higher human wealth than older agents and consume more on that account (\(\dot{C}/C \uparrow\)). On the other hand, older households have positive real wealth (\(\dot{C}/C \downarrow\)).
There is nothing to rule out a macroeconomic equilibrium which is dynamically inefficient, as in Figure 16.10.

If productivity declines rapidly as one ages then young agents save ferociously to provide for old-age consumption. As a result the aggregate capital stock may become too large from a social welfare point of view.

Oversaving is thus consistent with individually optimizing behaviour!
Figure 16.10: Dynamic inefficiency and declining productivity